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Chapter 4
Democracy and Peace
The observation that democracies rarely if ever ﬁght each other was made by Dean Babst
nearly three decades ago, but has had little impact on the literature on peace research and
international relations until recently. But now every volume of the leading journals contains
articles on minor and major aspects of this theme. Professional jealousy and confusion of
levels of analysis are possible explanations for the late acceptance of the idea of a dem-
ocratic peace, but above all it seems to have been hampered by the Cold War. Erich Weede
has taken a bold step in reconsidering his own previous view and other should follow. The
Cold War has ended in the real world, and it should end in peace research, too.
‘Democracy encourages peaceful interaction among states’.1 This proposition
flourished during the Enlightenment—it was, for instance, a central part of the
political debates which surrounded the American and French revolutions. As early as
1795 Immanuel Kant described a ‘paciﬁc federation’ or ‘paciﬁc union’ created by
liberal republics.2 Much more recently this topic has become the subject of sys-
tematic empirical observation. In this issue of JPR we publish four articles on the
relationship between democracy and peace. In the ﬁrst, Weede (1992) reconsiders
his previously published view (1984, 1989) that extended deterrence and subordi-
nation to superpowers are the major pacifying conditions in the international system.
He now joins the emerging consensus that ‘democracies do not ﬁght each other’, that
democracies have established a ‘separate peace’. Forsythe (1992), while accepting
this conclusion, has a different main concern: to investigate a semi-deviant case, how
democracies may substitute covert action for overt force against popularly elected
governments which pursue policies strongly disliked by the United States or other
major democratic powers. Sørensen (1992) accepts the Kantian vision, while
wishing to retain some basic insights of neorealism. Russett/Antholis (1992) attempt
1This article was originally published as a ‘Focus On’ article in Journal of Peace Research 29(4):
369–376, 1992 and served as an introduction to a section with articles by Weede, Forsythe,
Sørensen, and Russett/Antholis. The abstract has been added.
2I would like to thank Bruce Russett, Anne Julie Semb, Harvey Starr, Erich Weede, and several
members of the editorial committee of the JPR, particularly Torbjørn L. Knutsen, for excellent
comments on an earlier draft. Since I am also the editor of the JPR, it is particularly appropriate to
emphasize that views expressed in this column are solely the responsibility of the author.
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to extend the coverage of the proposition that democracies rarely ﬁght each other to
the ancient Greek city-states. Two issues ago, Starr (1992) sought to link relatively
recent empirical ﬁndings about the lack of war among democracies to more estab-
lished theoretical ideas about pluralistic security communities (Deutsch et al. 1957).
These are but a few examples from a burgeoning literature. Every recent volume
of the leading journals in international relations and peace research contains articles
on some major or minor aspect of this theme.
The observation that democracies do not ﬁght each other was made almost three
decades ago by Babst (1964, 1972).3 Babst had examined data on 116 major wars
from 1789 to 1941 from Wright (1965) and found that ‘no wars have been fought
between independent nations with elective governments’ (1964: 10). Applying a
probabilistic argument to the two world wars of this century, he concluded that it
was extremely unlikely all the elective governments (10 out of the 33 independent
nations participating in World War I; 14 out of 52 in World War II) should be on
the same side purely by chance.
A second round of debate was initiated by Rummel (1983), who argued that
‘libertarian’ states were more peaceful and that libertarian states never fought each
other.4 His argument quickly led to rejoinders by Chan (1984), Weede (1984), and
others. At the same time, Doyle (1983, 1986) was developing an argument based on
the views of Kant.
After nearly a decade of debate following Doyle’s and Rummel’s articles, there
is now a near-consensus on two points: that there is little difference in the amount of
war participation between democracies and non-democracies (Rummel being the
major dissenter here) but that wars (or even military conflicts short of war) are
non-existent (or very rare) among democracies. Indeed, several scholars have
echoed Levy’s statement that this ‘absence of war between democratic states comes
as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations’ (Levy
1989: 270). This empirical regularity has never been seriously called into question.
Enthusiasm for this remarkable ﬁnding should be tempered with an appreciation
that it applies only in cases where a relatively high threshold is set for both
‘democracy’ and ‘war’. Take democracy ﬁrst: Most scholars have followed (more or
less) the criteria carefully speciﬁed by Small/Singer (1976): (a) free elections with
opposition parties, (b) a minimum suffrage (10 %); and (c) a parliament either in
control of the executive or at least enjoying parity with it. Schweller (1992: 240)
3According to Doyle (1986: 1166) this empirical regularity was noted by Streit (1938: 88, 90–92),
but his book appears to have had little fall-out in the academic literature.
4Rummel’s views had been stated earlier, in vol. 4 (1979) and vol. 5 (1981), in his magnum opus
Understanding Conflict and War. In 1979 his proposition 16.11 (Joint Freedom) read: ‘Libertarian
systems mutually preclude violence’ (1979: 277) and he cited Babst’s work as evidence. But this
was merely one out of 33 wide-ranging propositions within a gigantic philosophical scheme
summed up later (1981: 279) in his ‘Grand Master Principle’: Promote freedom with three cor-
ollaries, including no. 3: Freedom maximizes peace from violence. The immoderate pretensions of
this scheme, along with Rummel’s unrelenting liberalism and extremely hawkish views on
defense, may have deterred readers from noticing what was in fact the strongest proposition in the
series.
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applauds Doyle’s deﬁnition of ‘representative government’ with the suffrage level
raised to at least 30 % (and female suffrage granted within a generation of its initial
demand) and further requires the government to be (d) ‘internally sovereign over
military and foreign affairs’ and (e) stable (in existence for at least 3 years). He also
adds (f) individual civil rights and—more controversially perhaps—(g) private
property and a free-enterprise economy. Attempts to lower the thresholds in empirical
studies have not been successful: During the PeloponnesianWars, ‘democracies were
slightly more likely to ﬁght one another than to ﬁght any other type of regime’
(Russett/Antholis 1992: 424) even though a norm was found to be emerging among
democracies against ﬁghting other democracies. Using cross-cultural ethnographic
evidence from the Human Relations Area Files, Ember et al. (1992) found more
supportive evidence, but the hypothesis had to be substantially revised to be testable
on these data.5 Even in the modern age, lowering the suffrage threshold makes an
anomalous case of the British-American war of 1812.6
Lowering the threshold for war below the 1,000 battle deaths used in the
Correlates of War datasets on international and extrasystemic wars also produces
less clear-cut results. Maoz/Abdolali (1989) and Maoz/Russett (1992) have tested
propositions about democracy and war on the dataset on ‘militarized interstate
disputes’, also generated within the COW project (Gochman/Maoz 1984). In the
latest of these studies, 15 cases of disputes between democracies have to be
accounted for. To forestall criticism that war is so rare an event that ‘it is difﬁcult to
demonstrate the effectiveness of pacifying conditions’ (p. 380), Weede extends his
study, too, to the militarized disputes dataset. This yields one such dispute between
two democracies, Finland and Norway! Weede fails to ﬁnd this dispute in other
comparable datasets and raises questions about the coding scheme of the militarized
disputes data. However, there was in fact a dispute between Finland and Norway in
1976–77 (about German NATO forces in Norway) and this discussion also referred
to the friendship treaty between Finland and the USSR, which might be invoked in
the case of a new threat from Germany. It may or may not be reasonable to
characterize this as a ‘militarized dispute’; in any case, such incidents are so far
from war that it is unreasonable to assume they should be accounted for by the same
factors.7
‘Democracies don’t ﬁght each other’—why was such a simple observation not
made in the great classical studies of war? Richardson (1960) did not touch this
topic at all. Wright (1965) dealt at some length with the relationship between
5The proposition tested was that internal warfare was lower in political units with widespread
political participation (Ember et al. 1992: 9).
6According to Small/Singer (1976: 54, n. 8) British suffrage did not exceed 3 % until 1867.
7After I wrote this, Weede reported that the incident is coded as having taken place in 1965, but
has no further information. Those responsible for the dataset have been unable to supply any
clariﬁcation, neither have Finnish researchers whom I have consulted on this problem. Similar
episodes to the one mentioned from 1976–77 did occur in the 1960s, although not as serious, and
one of them could have resulted in this mysterious coding.
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democracy and war, but did not comment on the lack of war between democracies.8
And why, when this striking regularity was noticed in the early 1960s, did it take
nearly thirty years before it became widely acknowledged?
One answer to the latter question may be professional jealousy. Babst was a
criminologist and generally published in journals which must be regarded as
extremely obscure from a peace research point of view. Nevertheless, his second
article was spotted by professional students of war. In a frequently quoted article,
Small/Singer (1976: 51) lampooned Babst’s ﬁnding: ‘In a less academic enterprise,
a recent issue… prominently featured an analysis that allegedly ends the debate [on
regime-type and foreign conflict behavior] forever.’ Such a ‘seductive proposition’
was likely ‘to be accepted uncritically by those searching for some ray of hope in
the generally bleak picture of contemporary international relations’. Since they
found some of Babst’s coding rules to be ‘invisible’ they generated a new dataset
from their own Correlates of War project in order to examine Babst’s ‘superﬁcially
credible proposition’.
A second reason for the late acceptance may be methodological. A number of
early contributions to the literature confuse the issue of a national-level proposition
(democracies are more peaceful) and a dyadic-level proposition (democracies don’t
ﬁght each other). Babst argued strictly in terms of the latter (as Kant had done,
169 years earlier), but Singer & Small, in their polemic against Babst, set out to
demolish in some detail a proposition of the ﬁrst type, ‘the innate peacefulness of
the bourgeois democracies’. Thus, Small & Singer really knocked down a straw
man. But so persuasive was their article that for a long while no one pursued this
lead. When Rummel joined the battle he chose to defend the very thesis that Small
& Singer had disconﬁrmed, that ‘libertarian’ states were inherently more peaceful.
This drew attention away from his second thesis on dyadic peace between liber-
tarian states.
Despite the increasing methodological sophistication of research on international
violence, the difference between a main effect and an interaction effect is not always
grasped. Moreover, with an increasing number of nations, the idea of conducting
research at the dyadic level—where the number of units of analysis is roughly the
square of the number of nations—is not especially appealing, either to research
directors or funding agencies.
While the concept of an interaction effect may be too complicated, the ﬁnding
that democracies don’t ﬁght each other may also be seen as too simple, even
simplistic. In the midst of regression analyses, factor analyses, and numerous other
multivariate techniques, the idea that one variable alone is a sufﬁcient (but not
necessary) condition for a state of peace in the sense of non-war seems ridiculously
naive. For instance, towards the end of their article Small/Singer (1976: 67) did
8Wright concluded that continuous war undoubtedly favors despotism. The more democracies,
therefore, the greater the value of war to the despots. ‘The greater the number of sheep, the better
hunting for the wolves’ (p. 266). In a pure balance of power system, democracy probably cannot
survive. However, he also noted that democracies are better suited to ﬁght long wars because they
have stronger economies.
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admit that they could only ﬁnd two very marginal cases of ‘bourgeois democracies’
ﬁghting each other, but they dismissed this ‘superﬁcial proof of the innate peace-
fulness of the bourgeois democracies’ with a comment that this might perhaps be
accounted for by geographical proximity, since wars tended to be fought between
neighbors and few democracies had common borders. This is only the ﬁrst of many
attempts to explain away the idea of a separate peace among democracies with
reference to third variables—many of which have recently been put to rest by
Maoz/Russett (1992). Testing for third variables brings the issue into the normal
grind of research practice, but such tests for ‘statistical artifacts’ are less meaningful
in the case of perfect or near-perfect correlations.9 Regardless of the variables used
to subdivide a population of nation-pairs, a zero in the cell for joint democracy will
remain zero in any subdivision. It is possible, of course, that a third variable might
be found which would account for joint democracy as well as for nonwar. But the
only third variables which could perform such a feat would themselves need to have
a perfect relationship with both the other variables. A little reflection should sufﬁce
to show that geographical distance is not such a variable: most wars have been
between neighbors, but certainly not all. And although most democracies are not
neighbors, some are. In fact, in more than 25 years of research on ‘Correlates of
War’ no one has come up with any relationship nearly as strong as the dyadic
relationship between democracy and nonwar. Therefore, it seems extremely unli-
kely that such an underlying causal factor will be identiﬁed. Of course, it will not be
hard to ﬁnd separate third-variable explanations for each separate peace, deterrence
here, distance there, and so on. Such explanations will be advanced with particular
fervor by those hostile to any quantitative analysis.10 In fact, by their very diversity
they do little to bolster the many armchair generalizations, frequently single-factor
ones, about the war-making of democracies.
As far as third variables are concerned, the perfect or near-perfect correlation
between democracy and nonwar in dyads should soon begin to have a very different
effect: all research on the causes of war in modern times will be regarded as suspect
if it is not ﬁrst corrected for this factor. In fact, I would argue that most behavioral
research on conditions for war and peace in the modern world can now be thrown
on the scrap-heap of history, and researchers can start all over again on a new basis.
Despite mental resistance to such an idea, this is exactly as it should be in a
cumulative discipline. A similar caution must be exercised in formulating new
hypotheses about war. For instance, a number of authors are currently urging that
environmental problems are a major factor in causing war.11 This general thesis
seems extremely implausible if it is meant to include war over environmental issues
between democratic countries. As Diehl (1992: 340) points out, some relationships
9As will be recalled, Maoz/Russett (1992) found a signiﬁcant number of democratic dyads
engaging not in war but in ‘militarized disputes’—otherwise their exercise would have been futile.
10A good case in point—well-argued in its genre—is Cohen (1991).
11For particularly clear examples, see Colinvaux (1980) and Ehrlich/Ehrlich (1972). For more
skeptical views see Deudney (1990, 1991) and Lipschutz/Holdren (1989).
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are so powerful that they supersede any other conditions for war. The proper
approach here would be ﬁrst to sort out the double democratic dyads and then to
look at the environmental factors in outbreaks of war in the remaining dyads.12 Ten
years from now, the ﬁnding that democratic countries don’t war with each other will
probably be regarded as extremely trivial in a research design—a factor to be
corrected for before we get on with the real job of accounting for the wars that do
occur. By then, ‘antipositivists’ who now reject the democracy-nonwar relationship
may revert to their second line of defense, that quantitative research can do nothing
but belabor the obvious.
A further reason for discounting the dyadic relationship between democracy and
peace was that it seemed to be based, on the one hand, on rather raw empiricism
(Babst, Rummel) and, on the other, on airy philosophical principles (Kant, Doyle).
Schweller (1992: 235) argues that much of the literature is ‘data-driven’ and Lake
(1992: 24) feels that ‘No theory presently exists that can account for this striking
empirical regularity’. While this criticismmight have been true in the 1970s, it would
no longer seem to hold. Fairly elaborate theoretical arguments have been made in
terms of constraints on decision-makers in democracies, in terms of democracy as an
exercise in non-violent domestic conflict resolution which can be extended to
international affairs if a suitable (i.e. democratic) counterpart is found, in terms of
democracies seeing the mutual relationships as positive- sum rather than zero-sum, or
in terms of state rent-seeking, which creates an imperialist bias in a country’s foreign
policy, but less so in democracies.13 While there is as yet no consensus on which
theoretical rationale accounts best for the observed relationship—or on how to sep-
arate them empirically—there is at least no lack of convincing theories.
The apparent discrepancy between ﬁndings at the nation level and at the dyadic
level also calls for explanation. Theoretically, of course, the two can easily be linked:
the simplest way to do so is to assume that non-democratic nations tend to attack
peaceful democratic nations and that the wars fought by democratic countries are
always defensive. In this way, the war participation of the democracies becomes as
high as that of the non-democracies, even though the former are more peaceful.
12Like Weede and many others, but contrary to Rummel, I refrain from concluding that the
democratic peace is a deterministic relationship, thus making it possible for a single contrary case
to falsify the relationship. The various points made here hold even if wars between democracies
are only extremely rare and not zero. If there are deviant cases, however, it makes sense to look for
third variables to account for those cases.
13Lake (1992: 24) conceives of the state as a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm trading services (mainly
protection) for revenues. Autocratic states exhort exorbitant rents at the expense of their societies
and therefore tend towards imperialism.
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Small/Singer (1976: 66), however, found no differences between democratic and
non-democratic countries with respect to war initiation. More recently, Schweller
(1992: 249) hypothesized ‘that only authoritarian regimes initiate preventive war and
that they do so regardless of whether the challenger is democratic or authoritarian’,
he found the empirical evidence to be ‘overwhelming’ from Sparta to Nazi
Germany.14 Declining democratic leaders tend to seek accommodation when faced
by democratic challengers, and a defensive alliance when challenged by a nonde-
mocracy. Schweller found Israel to be the leading candidate for a deviant case from
the latter regularity—one, however, which does not contradict the main regularity
that we are discussing here. Morgan/Schwebach (1992: 312) also concluded ‘that
democratic states are less likely to escalate disputes than are non-democracies’. Lake
(1992: 30), on the other hand, maintains that ‘democracies are not only less likely to
wage war with each other’, but that ‘they are also signiﬁcantly more likely to win the
wars they ﬁght against autocracies’, a regularity which no doubt has contributed to
skepticism about the peacefulness of democracies. The debate on this and other
theoretical issues will obviously continue—hopefully some of it will take place in
this journal!
A ﬁfth reason for not taking much account of the democracy-war relationship at
the dyadic level is that when it was ﬁrst proposed by Kant there were only three
liberal regimes in existence (Switzerland, France, and the USA; Doyle 1986: 1164).
Thus, Kant’s writings might be dismissed as theoretical speculation about a
hypothetical future world with no empirical evidence and without much conse-
quence in a world of despots. In the two centuries since then a ‘separate peace’ has
spread to an increasing number of states: roughly 50 for the period since 1945,
according to Doyle. Not only are there more democracies around, but their numbers
are increasing. When 10 % of the world’s nations were democracies (roughly the
state of affairs in the 19th century) only close to 1 % of all nation-pairs were
excluded from war.15 With 50 % democracies—not an unrealistic target for the
close of this century—the separate peace encompasses close to 25 % of all pairs.
This, then, is the basis for the ‘obsolescence of war in the developed world’ her-
alded by Mueller (1989).
And ﬁnally, a more political explanation for the tardy response of the research
community to the idea of the separate democratic peace: Virtually all systematic
research concerned with causes of war has taken place in countries affected by the
14His systematic database included great-power preventive wars from 1665.
15Actually, because nations do not engage in wars with themselves, the correct percentage is (25x–
100)/(x–1), where x is the number of nations in the international system. As x increases, this comes
very close to 25 %. For instance, with 180 nations in the state system (a reasonable description of
the present system, although there are some ambiguous cases) the percentage is 24.6. If we also
assume that democratic nations are unlikely to engage in civil wars, then the percentage of pairs
excluded from war in a world with 10 % democratic nations is exactly 1 %. (And, more generally,
y% democratic countries yields y square % pairs excluded from war.)
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Cold War. Research attributing major importance to political democracy seemed
propagandistic to many peace researchers who subscribed to a ‘third way’ in the
Cold War and disliked anything that smacked of one-sided propaganda for ‘the free
world’.16 Babst’s original article was not entirely free of this preaching when it
suggested that democracy was a great force for peace and that ‘diplomatic efforts at
war prevention might well be directed toward further accelerating’ the growth of
elective governments. Small/Singer (1976: 51, n. 3) suggested, however, that
Babst’s prescription ‘could, paradoxically enough, turn out to be a major stimulus
to war’, an observation compatible with at least some of the rhetoric in the 1991
Gulf War. Among the potentially important policy implications of Rummel’s work
on this topic, Vincent (1987: 104) singled out one he clearly regarded as unsavory:
‘that American covert and overt interventions for the purpose of democratizing a
society would help promote peace in the world system’. The debate about impe-
rialism in the 1970s focused, unsurprisingly, more on the war-mongering nature of
several democracies than on their peacefulness. But the idea of a democratic sep-
arate peace seemed too soft for the realists, who felt more comfortable with
deterrence and strict bipolarity (and still do, as is evidenced by the doomsday
predictions for Europe after the Cold War in a celebrated article by Mearsheimer
1990).17 As a former member of the deterrence school of thought, Weede has taken
a bold step in reconsidering his own views. Peace researchers who rejected the link
between democracy and peace from a radically different paradigm should not be
less forthright. The strong ﬁnding about the ‘democratic peace’ may to some extent
have been a victim of the Cold War. No wonder then that it fell to an ‘innocent
criminologist’ to observe that the emperors had no clothes. The Cold War has now
ended in the real world; it should end in peace research, too.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
16Of course, many countries in the ‘free world’ were neither free nor peaceful.
17A third group which may be reluctant for political reasons to acknowledge the persistence of the
dyadic relationship between democracy and peace is the functional (or integrationist) school of
thought. Conventional wisdom has it that the creation of the Common Market has helped preserve
the peace between the traditional enemies Germany and France. Although the idea of the
impossibility of war between highly interdependent countries—put forward with much fanfare by
Angell (1910)—should have been thoroughly discredited by World War I, it continues to have
strong backing in political thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. If the idea of a separate peace
between independent democracies holds, then it has no direct bearing on war and peace if these
countries continue in the present European Community, develop it into a European Union, or leave
it altogether. Neither does it have any signiﬁcance if additional democratic countries join a
European Union or not—although this may be a good (or a bad) idea, for a number of other
reasons. On the other hand, if countries with fragile democracies are allowed to join the European
Community and if membership in the EC helps to stabilize their democratic government—two big
ifs!—then the European Community may nevertheless function as a peace factor. The same
argument can be applied to postwar Germany, Italy, and possibly other European states.
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